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INTEGRATION IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD
YARIV BRAUNER*
INTRODUCTION
During the second half of the last century, many countries
gradually replaced their so-called classical corporate tax re-
gimes, under which corporate earnings were taxed twice -
once in the hands of the corporation, and again when distrib-
uted to corporate shareholders as dividends - with an inte-
grated regime (imputation), which taxed such earnings only
once.1 The driving force behind this trend was the expecta-
tion of significant efficiency gains. This clear and gradual
trend has been abruptly reversed with the turn of the century.
The phenomenon we call globalization, and in particular the
proliferation of cross-border business and investment, has ma-
terially contributed to this dramatic sea change in the corpo-
rate tax world. The conventional wisdom was that imputation
is unsustainable in a world whose markets integrate. This arti-
cle argues that the abandonment of imputation is partly a con-
sequence of our essentially non-cooperative world in terms of
tax policy coordination. It concludes that imputation does not
have to be the victim of globalization - it can be retained to
the benefit of many countries, but only through enhanced in-
ternational cooperation and coordination of tax policies.
The goal of integration is to alleviate the over ("double")
taxation of corporate profits, consequently reducing the effec-
tive tax rates on returns on investments through corpora-
tions. 2 Perhaps the most popular method used for this pur-
* Associate Professor of Law, Arizona State University College School
of Law. I thank Reuven Avi-Yonah, Adam Chodorow, Zohar Goshen, Jen-
nifer MacDonald, John Steines and the participants of tax policy workshops
at the Universities of Michigan and Tel Aviv Law Schools for their useful
comments, assistance and support - All mistakes and inaccuracies are mine.
1. Any method that results in less than full double taxation could be
considered an integration method, however, this article focuses on imputa-
tion, both as a proxy for full integration (one level of tax) and because it was
the most dominant method of integration throughout the last century.
2. This could be achieved in various ways, with some different achieve-
ments, advantages and disadvantages in practice. This article focuses on the
method that was considered the most accurate and popular of all integration
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pose was the imputation method, which extended credits to
shareholders for the corporate income tax paid by a distribut-
ing corporation "on their behalf." The expectation of signifi-
cant efficiency gains from its adoption was comfortably sup-
ported by economic theory.4 However, in less than five years,
most of the countries that had adopted integration have rein-
troduced a second level of taxation on corporate profits.5
This volteface does not reflect a rejection of the underly-
ing economic principles supporting integration, but rather re-
flects a market change. In particular, increased international
trade has created pressure to eliminate cross-border discrimi-
nation by extending, inter alia, the benefits of integration to
foreigners and foreign investments. 6 The imputation method,
which was popular in a domestic context, could not be sus-
tained as a purely domestic measure in a global economy, and
countries were not willing to extend its benefits across-bor-
ders. 7 This pressure was primarily significant in the European
Union (hereinafter "E.U."), whose institutions support harmo-
nization (not only non-discrimination based reciprocity) of
methods - full imputation, as elaborated below. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ &
ALVIN C. WARREN, JR., INTEGRATION OF THE U.S. CORPORATE AND INDIVIDUAL
INCOME TAXES: THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT AND AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
REPORTS (1998) (an extensive review and analysis of the various integration
methods).
3. For example, with respect to their shareholding in the corporation
and the distributions made to them out of corporate profits.
4. CHARLES E. McLuRE, JR., MUST CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED TWICE?
(1979); Deborah H. Schenk, Foreword: Colloquium on Corporate Integration, 47
TAX L. REV. 427 (1992); Graetz & Warren, supra note 2. Note that most of
the analysis was conducted assuming relatively closed markets, which was ap-
propriate at the time. See, e.g., Robin W. Boadway, The Economic Rationale
for Integration, Address Before the Corporate Tax Management Conference
(1998), in BUSINESS TAX REFORM 21:1-26 (analyzing the international aspects
of integration in the context of a Canadian tax reform evaluation).
5. See infra Part II.C.
6. See Richard Vann, Trends in Company/Shareholder Taxation: Single or
Double Taxation, 88a CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONAL 21, 24 (2003);
Reuven Avi-Yonah, Back to the 1930s? The Shaky Case for Exempting Dividends,
97 TAX NOTES 1599 (2002).
7. This unwillingness arose from the conventions of the international
tax regime, which were premised on the classical system, and therefore did
not require such an extension, and from the understanding of some integra-
tion countries that unilateral extension of such benefits would amount to a
transfer to the treaty partner's fisc rather than the investors. See examples
infra Part II.B.
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member states' tax systems8 - a difficult task with the present
(allegedly discriminatory) integration rules in place. 9
Most imputation countries10 chose therefore to replace
imputation with a hybrid system - a system which taxes divi-
dends separately and without reference to the corporate tax
paid on corporate profits (similar to a classical system)," yet at
a reduced rate (below the normal individual tax rate).12 This
8. See, e.g., Joe Kirwin, Marks & Spencer Case Demonstrates Need for Common
Tax Base in EU, Official Says, BNA's INT'L TAX MONITOR (Feb. 3, 2005) (cit-
ing, on the condition of anonymity, an E.U. commission official supporting
tax base harmonization, and evaluating whether it would be better to get
there directly, through member states' negotiation or with the pressure of
an ECJ decision to that effect).
9. See, e.g., Uwe Ilhi et al., Trends in Company/Shareholder Taxation: Single
or Double Taxation, 88a CAHIERS DE DROIT FIscAL INTERNATIONAL 71, 73
(2003).
10. See infra Part II.C.
11. This separate taxation of corporate earnings and corporate distribu-
tions is at the core of the classical system, which simply treats corporations as
"legal persons" separate from their shareholders for tax purposes. It accepts
this (corporate law) fiction, probably with the view that one of the obliga-
tions of a corporation as such is to pay taxes like any other (flesh and blood)
person. I find this acceptance quite odd, and I could not find any serious
discussion in support of such acceptance. It is, however, a widely-accepted
feature of tax law throughout the world, and its analysis and potential criti-
cism are beyond the scope of this article. It is a worthwhile future project.
The formalistic justification was supplemented with various, more sophisti-
cated justifications, which are, in fact, attempts to justify the corporate tax
itself as having a stand-alone justification, such as the capture of government
benefits that only corporations enjoy (See, e.g., Herwig Schlunk, I Come Not To
Praise the Corporate Income Tax, But To Save It, 56 TAX L. REv. 329 (2003)), of
certain corporate specific rents, and of corporate governance controls
(Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the Corpo-
rate Tax, 90 VA. L. REv. 1193 (2004)). None of these, in my opinion, justi-
fies the corporate tax that countries actually employ, and surely cannot jus-
tify the high rates of the separate corporate tax. Therefore, they cannot
justify the classical system.
12. At first glance the United States fits into this picture quite oddly. Its
corporate tax policy experienced a relevant sea change as well, but in the
opposite direction. For the first time, despite a notorious and long lasting
resistance to depart from the classical system, it effectively did just that in
2001. Prior to 1938, the U.S. tax system was not primarily classical, and in-
cluded various levels and forms of integration. For the best and most con-
cise review of these developments see John K. McNulty, A Brief Look at the
Early History of the Unintegrated Corporate and Individual Income Taxes in the
USA, in INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE TAXATION - ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
KLAUS VOGEL 163 (Kees van Raad ed., 2002). Like any other operating classi-
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"reduced rate" system survives the scrutiny of nondiscrimina-
tion and preserves "some" integration, thereby creating a re-
duced overall tax burden on corporate profits.' 3 The accept-
ance of the hybrid system proves that integration as a concept
was not rejected, but rather the particular use of imputation
for achieving integration was considered unsustainable.
The advent of this rough-justice integration method was
explained primarily by the aforementioned nondiscrimination
pressures, particularly in the E.U. context. This article offers
an additional, complementary explanation to this conven-
tional wisdom, namely that integration, and particularly impu-
tation, is indeed not sustainable in a globalizing world econ-
omy only so long as countries do not sufficiently cooperate in
coordination of their tax policies. It argues further that the
benefits of integration may be preserved through enhanced
international cooperation and coordination of tax polices.
Such an effort should, however, be made within the existing
international tax regime,14 which has evolved with globaliza-
tion, but has always been largely premised on the classical sys-
cal system, the U.S. System had various optional or partial regimes that re-
sulted in at least partial integration for some income or some taxpayers. See,
e.g., id. at 174-75. Additionally, various so-called self-help integration
evolved, most notably since the enactment of the "check-the-box" regime.
This is a very significant turn in U.S. tax policy but, as demonstrated below, it
is not inconsistent with the global trend described above, and - it adopted a
similar policy measure - a reduced dividend rate system. The U.S. policy
change is noteworthy also because integration has been on the U.S. Interna-
tional tax policy agenda for almost half a century now but, despite a strong
consensus among experts and sometimes expectedly potent political sup-
port, the classical system remained a cornerstone of the U.S. federal income
tax. The resilience of the classical system was explained primarily by politi-
cal and political economy reasons. SeeJennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss,
A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE L.J. 325 (1995). In addition,
the inherent conservatism among tax experts and legislators often lead to
additional difficulties in any attempt to reform tax laws. This is especially
true when the practice in question is as deep-rooted in practice as the classi-
cal system. The new U.S. rules were relatively easy to adopt, inter alia, be-
cause their "halfway" system may be perceived as very similar to the classical
system; it still taxes corporate distributions without any reference to the cor-
porate (earnings) tax, albeit at a different rate.
13. See, e.g., infra Table II(A).
14. The international tax regime is embodied primarily in bilateral tax
treaties following the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (hereinafter "OECD") model.
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tem. 1 5 Despite the prominence of imputation systems in the
second half of the twentieth century, the international tax re-
gime remained undeveloped and one-dimensional as far as
corporate taxation was concerned.
The choice of reduced dividends tax rate reflects a belief
that it was less difficult to coordinate tax policies this way, par-
ticularly because no reference between the corporate tax and
the tax on corporate distributions, which may be imposed in
different countries, was required. It also demonstrates a pre-
occupation of policy makers with the classical system as a logi-
cal "baseline," or default system despite the fact that it is really
just one pole of many reasonable policy options. These expla-
nations for the hybrid system are not satisfactory, especially as
the effect of the interplay between different countries' tax pol-
icies on each other's policy choices is becoming increasingly
powerful. It would be desirable hence to rethink the disposi-
tion of the international tax regime with the classical system
anyway - preferably adjusting it to accommodate imputation
and the capture of its efficiency benefits.
The article first identifies and elaborates on this contem-
porary trend of conceding integration. 16 Part II discusses the
recent moves away from integration in some major economies,
and analyzes the reasons for such moves. It tracks them to the
international dimension of integration which has never been
comprehensively explored even in the golden era of imputa-
tion, a neglect which came back to haunt these economies at
the turn of the century.1 7
Part III analyzes the international aspects of integration
and its affect on tax policies to date. It sets forth the argument
that current tax policies arise from the non-cooperative funda-
15. Hugh J. Ault, Corporate Integration, Tax Treaties and the Division of the
International Tax Base: Principles and Practices, 47 TAX L. REv. 565 (1992).
16. See Vann, supra note 6, at 23 (the first significant statement of this
trend has probably been Professor Richard Vann's general report at the
Congress of the International Fiscal Association on the subject).
17. The international aspects of taxation were neglected in the bulk of
the analysis of integration, which concentrated primarily on domestic as-
pects. See id. at 24. The few authors who explored the international aspects
of integration include: Richard M. Bird, International Aspects of Integration, 28
NAT'L TAx J. 302 (1975); Richard Vann, International Implications of Imputa-
tion, 2 AUSTL. TAX F. 451 (1985); Ault, supra note 15; Douglas R. Fletcher,
The International Argument for Corporate Tax Integration, 11 Am. J. TAx POL'Y
155 (1994).
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mental features of the current international tax regime. As re-
taliation and undesirable spillovers became more significant
and material, it was not sufficient that integration was consid-
ered the most desirable policy from a domestic perspective,
since the potential revenue flight that resulted from integra-
tion made it an undesirable policy overall.
Part IV concludes with a suggestion that enhanced inter-
national cooperation and coordination of tax policies may al-
low countries to pursue integration while minimizing the
problems of revenue flight risk or retaliation that plagued the
imputation systems. Such cooperation could enable countries
to capture many of the efficiency gains associated with the
lower effective tax rates under integration regimes.' 8
18. This exposure is an interesting, but not unique example of a funda-
mental tension in international tax policy that globalization brought to the
center stage, namely the revenue flight tension; the other is the multina-
tional enterprise (hereinafter "MNE") tension. I elaborated on these ten-
sions elsewhere. Yariv Brauner, Taxing Cross-Border Mergers & Acquisitions,
2004 FLA. TAx REv. 953 (2004). The revenue flight dilemma arises from the
non-cooperative features of the international tax world. Professor Avi-Yonah
has compared this problem, in the context of withholding tax on interest, to
a "stag hunt" game, where all the participants avoid initiating cooperative
action through unilateral measures to the detriment of them all. See Reuven
S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare
State, 113 -ARv. L. REv. 1573, 1583 (2000). A country may wish to promote
certain policies, but it is not completely free to do so since other countries
may respond in a way that will either circumvent such policies or result in a
revenue flight from that country. Countries try therefore to optimize their
policies and adopt "coherent" tax rules that ameliorate the risks of retalia-
tion and circumscription, including some limited coordination efforts,
mainly through BTT. The MNE tension arises from the fiction of the corpo-
ration as a separate legal personality and our inability to identify the inci-
dences of the corporate income tax. In the economic reality MNEs perform
as single firms, doing business (worldwide) in the global market. The legal
reality ignores this economic reality and attributes "separateness" to the (ec-
onomically) inseparable parts of this firm, and only to these parts that the
firm itself elected to present as separable. Very little legal scholarship has
been written about this tension. In a recent working paper, Professor Avi-
Yonah lays a conceptual model for analyzing the application of national laws
to MNEs. He does not, however, focus on tax in the version available at the
time this article is written. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, National Regulation of
Multinational Enterprises: An Essay on Comity, Extraterritoriality, and Harmoniza-
tion (U. Mich. Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 00-01,
2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRNID3232
24_code020812630.pdfPabstractid=323224. Tax law, in particular, is prima-
rily domestic, and severely suffers from this tension. I find it useful to ex-
[Vol. 2:51
INTEGRA770N IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD
II.
THE RISE AND FALL OF INTEGRATION
A. Integration in Theory
A considerable amount of economic and legal writing has
explored the advantages and disadvantages of integration in
its various forms.' 9 The focus of this literature has been un-
equivocally on the efficiency benefits of integration, arguing
that integration relieves some major distortions that arise from
the fiction that corporations are separate legal "persons" and
the extension of this fiction to tax law through a separate cor-
porate income tax. Without integration, i.e., under a "classi-
cal" system, the corporate tax imposes a "double tax" (which is
a popular name for the economic distortion created by the
separate taxation of corporate earnings and corporate distri-
butions; "double tax" because such a tax system over-taxes
such investments in comparison to equivalent investments
through non-incorporated entities, such as partnerships and
sole-proprietorships) on income from investments through
corporations. This distortion creates a bias against the use of
the corporate form and a disincentive to invest in new corpo-
rate equity.20 The bias is not one dimensional, however, since
it depends on the tax rates involved and other rules that may
affect one's choice of business form, such as the exclusive per-
mission for corporations to not distribute their profits annu-
plain the effects of globalization on international taxation with these two
fundamental tensions. In the case of integration, the tension is between the
intention to adopt the most desirable policy domestically (integration) and
the reluctance to do so due to an increased risk of revenue flight, to which it
exposes the adopting country. Vann, supra note 6, at 24. The MNE tension
is more complex. The redeployment of cash and property within the enter-
prise may be desirable on efficiency grounds, and dividends are the most
straightforward way to do that. Nonetheless, the home country of the enter-
prise and the country in which the cash or property arose (the "source"
country in the international tax lingo) divide the rights to tax any income
related to these cash and property on bases other than efficiency. The inter-
national convention in this regard follows the "separateness" fiction, totally
ignoring the existence of MNEs.
19. And, therefore, it is not for this article to comprehensively review it.
Most of the conclusions of this literature, however, are mentioned in this
article where it is appropriate to make its point. Good reviews of the eco-
nomic and legal literature regarding integration include: GRAETZ & WAR-
REN, supra note 2; Vann, supra note 6.
20. See McLuRE, supra note 4.
20051
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ally, namely deferral, which encompasses timing benefits.
Deferral and the additional layer of corporate income tax, to-
gether with other, less significant rules, distort the choice of
business form in opposite directions and deliver a schizo-
phrenic "tax message" to the relevant decision makers. 21 The
other side of this message is that taxpayers turn it into an op-
portunity and exploit these opposing rules for their own tax
planning purposes.
Another major distortion of the classical system resulting
from the same mixed signals is that it encourages inefficient
retention of profits by the corporation. 22 This distortion of
the choice between retention and distribution of corporate
earnings has been particularly popular in the debate, used by
integration proponents as an argument in the context of eco-
nomic stimulation and growth.
Selective deferral and the additional layer of corporate
tax do not begin to describe the schizophrenia of present cor-
porate tax systems. For instance, dividend distributions are
typically not deductible for the distributing corporation,
whereas interest is. This fact makes dividends even less popu-
lar. This differential treatment distorts the financing decisions
of corporations, encouraging them to retain earnings or raise
capital in debt rather than equity form, which may result in
over-leveraging of corporations, increased borrowing costs,
and the potential risk of excessive collapses and bankrupt-
cies.23
The effect of these distortions was considered to be mate-
rial. The U.S. Treasury Report of 1992 estimated that moving
to integration would result in welfare gains of approximately
21. In reality, the system may be even more complex, as iterated by
Graetz with respect to the U.S. classical system in which "corporate income is
sometimes taxed twice in the U.S., sometimes once, and sometimes not at
all." GRAETZ & WARREN, supra note 2, at 53.
22. See McLuRE, supra note 4. The incentives in this regard depend also
on the relative tax rates on corporations, shareholders and capital gains. If
the latter are low, as they have traditionally been in the U.S., and corporate
tax rates are also low relatively to the individual tax rates, a strong incentive
to retain earnings is created.
23. Id. Other tax-advantaged forms of corporate distributions may also
be preferred to dividends in a classical system. The classic example for this
distortion in the U.S. has been the preference of stock repurchases resulting
in lower-taxed capital gains rather than ordinary income (dividends).
[Vol. 2:51
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$2.5 billion to $25 billion per year in 1992 dollars.24 A word of
caution is due, however, since these estimates are very difficult
to make and are highly sensitive to the modeling methods, the
methods of integration to which the classical system is com-
pared, and their specific details. 25 Moreover, the "new" view
of dividends in the finance literature cast doubt over these re-
sults, since according to this view (at least most of) the corpo-
rate income tax is capitalized into share prices by the capital
markets, and therefore, the efficiency gains mentioned above
should be significantly lower. 26 Additionally, the classical sys-
tem alone is not responsible for these distortions.
Although fewer discussions were devoted to the effect of
the corporate tax system on corporate governance, a few schol-
ars commented on the potential benefits of integration in that
context. The most obvious benefit is that integration removes
the tax incentive (or excuse) for retention, resulting in a likely
increase in management discipline.2 7 Professors Arlen and
Weiss argued that the resilience of the classical system can only
be fully explained by the different objectives of managers and
shareholders - the former pursuing primarily new investments
and use for the retained earnings trapped in the corporation
as a result of the double taxation of corporate profits rules,
and the latter also pursuing higher returns on old investment,
which are not fulfilled due to the above tax trap. 28 Integration
should remove this trap and consequently align the interests
of managers and shareholders. Professor Zohar Goshen noted
that integration would eliminate the tax distortion of dividend
policy (essentially the bias resulting from the deferral opportu-
nity and the effective preferential taxation of capital gains),
24. GRAETZ & WARREN, supra note 2. But see Reed H. Shuldiner, Commen-
tary, Corporate Integration: Do the Uncertainties Outweigh the Benefits? 47 TAX L.
Rxv. 653 (doubting the magnitude of these efficiency gains).
25. But, the treasury report mentions that "one striking feature of the
calculations is that within each model, and for a given financing assumption,
structurally different [integration] prototypes often have similar overall ef-
fects on economic well-being." GRAETZ & WARREN, supra note 2.
26. See, e.g., Auerbach infra note 133.
27. An interesting recent perspective of this behavior pattern is given by
Mihir A. Desai et al., Dividend Policy Inside the Firm (EFA 2002 Berlin Meetings
Presented Paper, Working Paper, March 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=317040 (exploring dividend policies of foreign affiliates to multina-
tional parents - hence "inside the firm").
28. Arlen & Weiss, supra note 12, at 327.
20051
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ensuing in reduction of agency costs through the shift of con-
trol over dividend policy to the capital markets. 29
Despite the focus of the literature on efficiency, integra-
tion may have other important consequences. Although not
inevitable, most switches to integration resulted in revenue
losses, as predicted. The distributional aspects of the switch to
integration were also cast in doubt. Distributional conse-
quences of integration are difficult to determine, particularly
because a comparison must be made with the distributional
consequences of the classical system, which themselves are
controversial. A Treasury integration report found only slight
distributional effects in the switch to integration.30 For the
purposes of this article, I take these results at face value since
the question of distribution should be addressed locally, con-
sidering traditions and social policies that differ from one
country to another. These effects should not affect the princi-
pal question of whether to adopt integration, but rather the
actual method and level of integration chosen.
Finally, some countries had additional reasons to adopt
integration, as elaborated on later in this section. 31 In gen-
eral, it is fair to say that some imputation systems partially suc-
ceeded in achieving their goals.32 This less than hoped for
success was often attributed to unrelated, contradictory gov-
ernment policies, which negated the effects of integration. 33
As explored below, countries were not typically discouraged by
integration in general, but instead replaced imputation with a
reduced-rate system, and some major countries preserved im-
putation despite the global trend away from it.
B. Integration in Numbers - Current Rules
Some benefits of integration are easy to identify in the
following simplified numeric example. In Table I, two proto-
typical integration methods - imputation and dividend ex-
29. Zohar Goshen, Shareholder Dividend Options, 104 YALE L.J. 881, 915
(1995).
30. GRAETZ & WARREN, supra note 2, at 19.
31. See infra Part I.C.
32. For a recent study see Andrew Prevost, Ramesh P. Rao & John D.
Wagster, Dividend Imputation and Shareholder Wealth: The Case of New Zealand,
29J. Bus. FIN. & Acc. 1079 (2002).
33. See infra Part II.C.
[Vol. 2:51
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emption 34 - are compared to each other and to the baseline
classical system, using tax rates roughly equivalent to the cur-
rent relevant U.S. Tax rates:3 5
TABLE 1
Classical Imputation Div. Exemption
Corporation level tax
Corporate income 100 100 100
Corporate tax (35%) 35 35 35
Corporate income after tax 65 65 65
Shareholder level tax
Dividend distribution 65 65 65
Gross-up for corporate tax paid - 35 -
Individual income 65 100 0
40% Individual tax 26 40 -
Imputation credit - 35 -
Net shareholder tax 26 5 0
Total tax: 61 40 35
Shareholder income after tax 39 60 65
It is clear from this example that there is no difference
between these methods at the corporate level. 3 6 It is also clear
that the overall tax burden that the classical system imposes on
investment through corporations, as long as earnings are not
retained, is significantly higher than the burden imposed by
the other methods, or the burden on investment in non-incor-
porated entities, which should be similar to that of the imputa-
tion system. Most corporations, however, take advantage of
deferral opportunities (not available to non-incorporated enti-
ties), so the difference in burden may be, in reality, much
smaller, or even reversed.37 This fact, however, does not make
the comparison useless because deferral also potentially repre-
34. These are also the methods recommended in the two major U.S. in-
tegration proposals prepared in the early 1990's. GRAETZ & WARREN, supra
note 2.
35. Note that these rates are not far from the normal level in most impor-
tant economies, as will be further emphasized below.
36. In the past, another method, usually called the split-rate method was
in use, notably in Germany, with respect to which that would not be true. See
infra Part II.C.1.
37. It depends on the relevant corporate and individual tax rates and the
duration of deferral.
2005]
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sents the distortion of the choice between retention and distri-
bution of earnings; it does make the differences in the nomi-
nal tax burdens less significant than the raw numbers above.
Finally, the difference between imputation and dividend ex-
emption simply represents the difference between the corpo-
rate tax rate and the shareholder tax rate used in the exam-
ple.38 The core difference between these methods is that im-
putation ensures taxation at the individual tax rate and
dividend exclusion ensures taxation at the corporate tax rate.
In most countries, (domestic) dividend income in the
hands of foreigners, as well as income from investments of
(domestic) residents in foreign enterprises, faced the classical
system even in countries where integration was used domesti-
cally.39 Table II(A) illustrates the tax consequences of invest-
ment in a corporation organized and operating in a classical
system country:
A classical source country collects, therefore, its full cor-
porate tax and acceptable 40 withholding tax regardless of the
method of taxation used in the residence country. Moreover,
all investment in domestic corporations, including domestic
investment, faces the same tax. All shareholders face at least
44.75% tax, and imputation country investors even face the
61% tax, equivalent to classical system countries' investors.
Note that a new method is introduced in this table - the re-
duced tax rate on dividends, which is a relaxed version of the
dividend exclusion method, and whose consequences in the
table above are identical to a dividend exclusion method, ex-
cluded here for brevity. In policy terms, the classical country
ensures, under current policy, capital export neutrality (here-
38. If, for instance, we used an individual tax rate equal to the corporate
tax rate, which is a standard policy advice - to make the top marginal rate
equal to the corporate tax rate in order to ameliorate incentives to do busi-
ness or invest through a corporate or a non-incorporated form - there
would really be no difference between the consequences of these two meth-
ods.
39. See Seppo Kari &Juoko Yla-Liedenpohja, Classical Corporation Tax as a
Global Means of Tax Harmonization 1-2 (Ctr. for Econ. Studies & Ifo Inst. for
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 665, 2002), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=301501.
40. The normal treaty rate for portfolio investment is 15%. See Organisa-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development, Articles from the Model Con-
vention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capita4 art. 10, Jan.28, 2003,
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/34/1914467.pdf.
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TABLE II(A)
Investor country Classical Imputation Reduced rate
Foreign Domestic (15% on
investment investment dividends)
Source country (classical)
Corporate income 100 100 100 100
35% corporate tax 35 35 35 35
After-tax corporate income 65 65 65 65
Withholding tax if distributed
(15%) 9.75 9.75 - 9.75
Residence country
Dividend (grossed up) 65 65 100 65
40% Individual tax 26 26 40 65*15%=9.75
Imputation credit - - 35 -
Foreign tax credit 9.75 9.75 - 9.75
Residual residence country
tax 16.25 16.25 5 0
Result
Total tax 61 61 40 44.75
Shareholder income after tax 39 39 60 55.25
Revenue split
Source country 44.75 44.75 - 44.75
Residence country 16.25 16.25 40 0
inafter "CIN")41 - completely with respect to imputation coun-
tries and at least minimally as far as dividend tax relaxation
methods are concerned.42
Table II(A) presents a portfolio investment scenario. The
consequences are conceptually identical, however, with re-
spect to direct investment (investment in a residence, rather
than a source country corporation doing business in the
source country). In that case, the residence country tentatively
taxes the same corporate income, yet provides relief - typically
41. The goal of CIN is to eliminate tax wedges between domestic and
foreign investments domestically. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, Taxing Interna-
tional Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies,
54 TAx L. REV. 261, 270-71 (2000).
42. I call it minimal CIN because it can only ensure CIN regarding the
investment in the domestic corporation. There will most probably be differ-
ences in effective tax rates on the investment as a whole due to full taxation
of the dividends in the residence countries using classical or imputation
methods and no or partial taxation of such dividends in the countries using
dividend tax relaxation methods.
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through an indirect foreign tax credit. There is usually a dif-
ference in withholding tax rates (5% rather than 15%) 4 3 and
in corporate tax rates that could result in additional tax in the
residence country but which do not change any of the policy
consequences. 44
Switching to the investor (residence) country perspective,
it is apparent that current rules provide a disincentive to invest
abroad.45 An investor from a classical method jurisdiction
faces the same level of tax in another classical jurisdiction, but
she relinquishes most of that tax in a foreign country.46 An
investor from an imputation country clearly faces a much
higher tax than she would have faced at home even if no distri-
bution is made, most of which is paid to a foreign country. An
investor from a reduced-rate country faces similar levels of tax,
all or most of which are paid to a foreign country. The differ-
ence between domestic investment and investment in a classi-
cal country for such investor depends on the level of dividend
taxes used. Complete dividend exemption would leave the
consequences unchanged, yet the burden higher (by the WHlT
rate) than that of a domestic investment. Any effective tax on
dividends makes this difference smaller, and if the rate equals
or exceeds the WHT rate, then there is no difference between
domestic and foreign investment. In conclusion, from a capi-
tal export neutrality (hereinafter "CEN") 47 perspective, the
biggest effect of the current rules is on imputation country in-
vestors in a classical country corporation. Other classical
countries, as well as reduced-rate countries, are essentially un-
affected. The latter are able to both maintain CEN and cap-
ture at least some of the benefits of integration by reducing
43. See Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Arti-
cles from the Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, art.
10, Jan. 28, 2003, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/34/1914467.pdf.
44. Additionally, the withholding tax may be replaced by a branch tax or
any equivalent version.
45. That is true from out narrow perspective, ignoring phenomena such
as: deferral, tax rate differences, tax evasion and tax havens.
46. This may, or may not matter to her. There may also be other, unre-
lated, reasons why it may be desirable to such investor to invest domestically
or not.
47. Aiming at eliminating tax incentives from a decision to export or not
to export capital (invest abroad). See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 42, at 270-72
(containing a good discussion of this standard).
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the effective tax rate on these investments (from 61 to 44.75 in
the above example).
The next example, in Table II(B) illustrates the tax conse-
quences of investments in a corporation organized and doing
business in an imputation system country (compared with do-
mestic investment):
TABLE II(B)
Investor country Classical
Foreign Domestic Foreign
investment investment investment
Source country (Imputation)
Corporate income
35% corporate tax
After-tax corporate income
Withholding tax if distributed
(15%)
Residence country
Dividend (grossed up)
40% Individual tax
Imputation credit
Foreign tax credit
Residual residence country
tax
Result
Total tax
Shareholder income after tax
Revenue split
Source country share
Residence country share
100
35
65
9.75
65
26
9.75
16.25
-- 9.75
26 16.25
61 61 61
39 39 39
44.75
16.25
- 44.75
61 16.25
An imputation source country does not follow CIN. In
most cases it collects more tax from foreign investors than the
total tax imposed on its own investors (44.75% v. 40% in our
example) .48
A classical country investor in an imputation country cor-
poration faces the same tax consequences she would have
faced at home or in an equivalent investment in another classi-
cal country. The revenue split is no different from the one in
another classical (or relaxed dividend tax) method country.
The classical residence country, therefore, preserves CEN
48. The only case where that would not be true is when the individual tax
exceeds the corporate tax significantly. Even then it is likely that the inves-
tor faces additional tax at home which will increase the effective tax on the
investment.
Imputation
Domestic
investment
20051
NYU JOURNAL OF LAW AND BUSINESS
under current rules regardless of the method used by the
source country.
An imputation country investor is not better off investing
in another imputation country - she faces similar tax conse-
quences to investment in a classical or other (reduced divi-
dend rate) countries. Consequently, current rules are CEN in-
consistent from an imputation country perspective regardless
of the method used in the source country. Similarly, for a re-
duced-rate country, the method used in the source country is
not a concern - its investors face the same consequences and it
faces the same revenue split regardless of that method, which
is why a column that duplicated these consequences (see Ta-
ble II(A)) was omitted from Table II(B).
In conclusion, as was explored and demonstrated earlier,
the current international tax norms, and particularly the bilat-
eral tax treaties based international tax regime are concep-
tually constructed on the premises of the classical system. 49 As
long as corporate tax rates are relatively similar among treaty
partners,50 classical countries maintain CEN relatively well.
They also by and large maintain CIN - they succeed, at least,
in collecting a large portion of the tax at source - corporate
tax, plus withholding or branch tax rates, according to accept-
able treaty norms. Imputation countries do not maintain CEN
under current rules regardless of the method used by the
source country. Their investors are leaving more tax in the
source jurisdiction than they would have paid at home on do-
mestic investments, and overall, they basically face classical sys-
tem tax burdens. In most cases, imputation countries also do
not maintain CIN under current rules. They often collect
more taxes from foreigners at source than they would have col-
lected from their investors on the whole investment, "showing"
all foreign investors its "classical face."
Finally, the consequences of investment in country em-
ploying a reduced-rate method, the adoption of which is the
trend explored in this article, are demonstrated in Table
II(C):
49. Vann, supra note 6.
50. Corporate tax rates show tendency to converge worldwide. The clas-
sic example was the global adjustment to the U.S. dramatic reduction of its
corporate tax rates in 1986.
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TABLE 11(C)
Investor country method:
Source country (reduced rate
Corporate income
35% corporate tax
After-tax corporate income
Withholding tax (15%)
Residence country
Dividend (grossed up if
relevant)
Individual (dividend) tax
Direct foreign tax credit
Residual residence country tax
Result
Total tax
Shareholder income after tax
Revenue split
Source country share
Residence country share
Domestic
investment
100
35
65
65
9.75
44.75
55.25
Foreign
investment
Classical Imputation Reduced rate
65 65
26 26
9.75 9.75
16.25 16.25
61 61 44.75
39 39 55.25
- 44.75 44.75
44.75 16.25 16.25
44.75
0
A reduced-rate country ensures, therefore, that all invest-
ment through domestic corporations leaves the same (44.75%
in our example) tax at source. Investors from other reduced-
rate countries should not incur additional tax at home, except
from differences in individual (dividend) tax rates. Under
current rules, investors from other countries face higher levels
of taxation - those typical in a classical system. So, within its
jurisdiction, CIN is well maintained, and only imputation
countries' investors face an inherent disincentive to invest in
reduced-rate countries in comparison to domestic investment.
This disincentive is not, however, unique to reduced-rate
countries as demonstrated in Tables II(A)&(B). CEN in also
basically maintained by reduced-rate countries, yet they typi-
cally do not collect much tax from such foreign corporate in-
vestments of their residents. Under current rules, the policies
of reduced rate countries reflect strong adherence to source
taxation.
Because reduced rate does not require linkage between
the corporate and shareholder level taxes, it fits well into the
scheme of the current classical system based international tax
rules, yet it succeeds in achieving integration both at the do-
mestic and international levels. These simplistic examples
demonstrate the appeal of this method for countries that
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found integration desirable, but could not cope with the diffi-
culties that imputation faced under current rules - also
demonstrated in the above examples. Theory becomes reality
in the next section, which reviews the actual trend away from
imputation.
C. The Rise of Integration in the Second Half of the 20th Century
This section puts the above theoretical literature in a
chronological and country-specific context in order to demon-
strate the prominence of integration and the widespread be-
lief in its merits - especially the efficiency merits of imputation
systems - in the second half of the 20th century. The purpose
of this concise, and by no means comprehensive, comparative
survey is to concretize and establish appreciation for the rise of
integration, as it is essential for appreciating the significance
of its abrupt fall at the turn of the century.
1. Germany
Germany first introduced modern 5 integration in 1953,
enacting its unique split-rate system, which taxed corporate
earnings designated for distribution more lightly than re-
tained corporate earnings.52 This remains the primary exam-
ple for integration at the corporate level despite its subsequent
repeal - an apparently unpopular method of integration re-
gardless of its theoretical efficiency appeal.53 The source of
this method is in post-war Germany, whose stock market was at
a very low point. Integration, especially at the corporate level,
51. Older forms of income taxes included some forms of integration as
well, for various reasons that will not be analyzed in this article. See, e.g.,
McNulty, supra note 12, at 163 (explaining the case of U.S. income taxes).
52. Harry G. Gourevitch, Corporate Tax Integration: The European Experi-
ence, 31 TAX LAw 65, 68-69 (1977).
53. Integration at the corporate level eliminates or reduces the addi-
tional level of tax on earnings of the legal fiction we call corporation. It
provides a better chance of achieving complete integration - equal taxation
of all investors in corporations at the investors' rates. It is unpopular be-
cause the adoption of this method reduces the corporate tax burden to all
investors, domestic and foreigners, and there is no reciprocal adjustment
required from the foreign residence country. The concern is that such a
system will result in a sheer transfer from the source country's fisc to that of
the residence country and no additional benefits.
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was believed to have the potential to revive investors' interests
in German corporate equity.5
4
In 1976 (effective as of January 1, 1977), Germany con-
ceded corporate level integration and switched to a full impu-
tation, shareholder level integration. This major policy reform
was not backed with clear goals except for the general belief in
the need to relieve double taxation on distributed earnings.55
The reform came in response to certain shortcomings of the
split-rate system: the (tax) bias in favor of debt financing over
equity financing, the possible reluctance of majority share-
holders to distribute earnings (which were still taxed at more
than 50%, in sharp contrast to the interests of minority share-
holders, therefore, having no interest to invest, similar to the
non-rich parts of the population), and the different tax treat-
ment of incorporated and unincorporated businesses. 56 The
imputation credit was not extended to foreign investors. Ger-
many continued to tax foreign investors on dividends received
from German corporations through withholding tax imposed
at the relevant treaty rates. In general, integration achieved
little more than its direct consequence of reduction of tax
rates on (mainly German) investments in German corpora-
tions.57 It is possible that this lack of success should be attrib-
uted to unrelated, but contradictory in consequence, govern-
ment policies. As demonstrated below, this is a common pat-
tern in many of the jurisdictions reviewed here.
The different treatment of foreign shareholders in Ger-
man corporations caused some difficulties, especially with Ger-
many's non-discrimination obligations toward other European
member states. Germany addressed these difficulties by al-
lowing residents of these countries to apply for a refund of the
corporate tax equal to the imputation credit. This refund,
54. Gourevitch, supra note 52, at 69.
55. Id. at 69-70 (citing the Ministry of Finance technical memorandum
which accompanied the legislation specifically rejecting a general theory
that it is unjustified to tax business entities separately). See also Paul
Franken, The Germany Report, in INTERNATIONAL FISCAL ASSOCIATION, IMPUTA-
TION SYSTEMS - OBJECTIVES AND CONSEQUENCES, at 36 (IFA Congress Seminar
Series No. 7, 1982). Other goals mentioned were: the improvement of debt-
to-equity ratios of German corporations and the performance of the stock
market.
56. Gourevitch, supra note 52, at 70-71.
57. Franken, supa note 56, at 40.
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nevertheless, was principally subject to a withholding tax of
25%. This meant that the discrimination was ameliorated, but
not eliminated. In 2001, the imputation system was repealed
in Germany as part of a large corporate tax reform, and it re-
turned to a supposedly classical system; in fact, a 25% flat-rate
corporate tax with 100% dividend exclusion for corporate
shareholders and 50% dividend exclusion for (German) indi-
vidual shareholders - effectively a reduced (half) rate system.
No comprehensive explanations or studies accompanied this
amendment, although it is believed to be the product of the
difficulty of adapting imputation to international business and
the perceived complexity of the system. 58
2. France
France introduced integration in 1965, when it replaced
its classical system with a partial imputation system, granting
shareholders a tax credit of half the dividend amount ("Avoir
Fiscal").59 The original principal objective of this reform was
(similarly to Germany) to revamp the French stock market.60
Moreover, the high corporate tax rate in France compared to
other major European countries resulted in an incentive for
French investors to invest in foreign corporations and deter
foreigners from investing in French corporations. The result-
ing low valuations of French corporations exposed them to
foreign takeover. 61 The 1965 reform effectively reduced the
corporate tax on distributed earnings to comparable levels
with France's competitors (mainly Germany).62 The reform
did not change distribution patterns, resulting in what seemed
58. The amendment is reported to be generally favorably accepted in
Germany despite its undesirable expected efficiency and distributional con-
sequences. See generally Dieter Endres & Andreas Oestreicher, 2001 Tax Re-
form in Germany - Planning for a New Era, 28 INTERTAx 408 (2000); Christiana
Djanani & Ralf Herbener, Trends in Company/Shareholder Taxation: Single or
Double Taxation, 88a CAHIERS DE DROIT FiscAL INTERNATIoNAL 399, 434-35
(2003).
59. This was complemented by an equalization tax (precompte mobilier)
paid by corporations whose incomes had not been subject to the corporate
tax. For the best review of this law see Gourevitch, supra note 52, at 67.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 68.
62. Id. Other measures were taken to assist French corporations to build
up their retained earnings, which allegedly eliminated a tax bias between
them and distributions. See Pierre F. Fontaneau, France's Report, in INTERNA-
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to be satisfactory reduction of the tax burden on investments
in French corporations. 6
3
One of the major proponents of integration, France also
extended integration to foreign interests through its tax trea-
ties. 64 Towards the end of the last century it became apparent
that, with economic globalization, both the amount of imputa-
tion credits extended to foreigners and equalization tax col-
lected increased significantly, and the administrative costs of
maintaining the system became considerable. 65 This created
pressure for reform, where the administrative costs and indus-
try's dislike of the equalization tax played a major role. 66 As a
result, as of 2001, France began, in a sequence of tax bills, to
reduce the corporate tax burden and the rate of the imputa-
tion credit allowed (though in a gradual manner), and finally
abolished the credit (and the equalization tax) as of 2004.67
The imputation system has been replaced by a reduced (half)
dividend tax rate system, none of whose benefits are extended
to foreigners. 68
TIONAL FIsCAL ASSOCIATION, IMPUTATION SYSTEMS - OBJECTIVES AND CONSE-
QUENCES, at 33 (IFA Congress Seminar Series No. 7, 1982).
63. See Gourevitch, supra note 52, at 68; see also Fontaneau, supra note 62,
at 34 (An ancillary objective - to attract more investment in corporate stock
by small (family) investors - has not been successful despite additional in-
centives, such as tax exemption for capped amounts of dividends paid to
individuals. The reasons for this failure, similarly to other countries, are
other, unrelated government policies that created opposite incentives).
64. See, e.g., Ault, supra note 15, at 585 (this practice included the treaty
with the U.S; however, in some treaties, France effectively eliminated the
withholding tax on dividends - for example, the France-Bahrain treaty in-
cluded a refund of the equalization tax to Bahrainian shareholders).
65. Philippe Derouin, Trends in Company/Shareholder Taxation: Single or
Double Taxation, 88a CAHIERS DE DROIT FIscAL INTERNATIONAL 375, 376
(2003).
66. Interestingly, the extension of the credit to foreigners was not consid-
ered to be a major concern. Id. at 395.
67. See, e.g., Ambroise Bricet, France's 2004 Finance Act, Amended 2003 Fi-
nance Act Change Tax Rules for Businesses, Shareholders, TAx ANALYSTS: WORLD-
WIDE TAx DAILY (Jan. 7, 2004) (LEXIS, 2004 WTD 4-5).
68. See, e.g., id. (no structured reduction of withholding tax rates on divi-
dends).
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3. The United Kingdom
The British corporate tax system adopted its modern inte-
gration method in 1972. 69 This was an imputation system
where corporations were obliged to pay an advanced corpo-
rate tax ("ACT") on distributed earnings. This ACT was
granted as a credit to the shareholders and also deducted from
the corporation's general (corporate) tax liability, which was
collected separately.70 Despite a strong opposition, the con-
servative government promoted this reform in the name of ef-
ficiency, believing it to remove the well-known distortions of
the corporate tax, and revive the capital markets. 71 These
goals have not been achieved generally, due mainly to contra-
dictory effects of other, unrelated government policies.7 2 The
U.K. was really the leader of the reversal trend, repealing ACT
as of 1999 and reducing the credit granted significantly, and
practically eliminating most of the benefits of integration from
foreigners. y3
4. Italy
Italy adopted a full imputation system in 1977 primarily
for efficiency reasons.74 Early reports attributed partial success
to the system. Similar to other countries, some of the failure
was attributed to reasons unrelated to integration itself. As of
2004, Italy replaced its imputation system with an (almost full)
dividend exemption system. The stated reasons for this re-
form has been the other E.U. members' pressure on the basis
69. It had had an integration system prior to 1966 as well, replaced by a
classical system until 1972.
70. Gourevitch, supra note 52, at 71-72.
71. Id. at 71. It is interesting to mention that the U.K. had adopted a
classical system just 7 years prior to that, under a labor government, in sup-
port of a build-up of retained earnings.
72. Stanley H. Wright, The UK.Report, in INTERNATIONAL FIsCAL AssocIA-
TION, IMPUTATION SYSTEMS - OBJECTIVES AND CONSEQUENCES, at 51-52 (IFA
Congress Seminar Series No. 7, 1982).
73. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2000-13, 2000-6 I.R.B. 515.
74. Siegfried Mayr, Italy's report, in INTERNATIONAL FIsCAL ASSOCIATION,
IMPUTATION SYSTEMS - OBJECTIVES AND CONSEQUENCES, at 43 (IFA Congress
Seminar Series No. 7, 1982).
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of non-discrimination (the E.U. free movement of capital prin-
ciple), and the complexity of the imputation system. 75
5. Norway and Finland
Finland was late to adopt integration because of some dis-
tinct structural characteristics of its markets and the role of
corporate taxation until the 1980's.76 In 1990, it introduced a
full imputation system, and consequently, significantly re-
duced the corporate tax rate.77 Despite expectations that the
imputation credit would be extended across borders, this has
been done only sparingly and through tax treaties. 78 Other
treaties resulted only in a reduction or elimination of the with-
holding tax on dividends,79 which was, it is important to note,
a halfway extension of integration across-borders. Finland
found it difficult to coordinate its imputation system with
other countries in a more fine-tuned way.80 In 2002, however,
the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court asked the ECJ
whether this non-perfect extension of the imputation system
across borders violated Finland's E.U. obligations8 " The back-
ground for this referral was in other cases that successfully
challenged a domestic application of integration in Europe. 2
The Finnish government expected to lose this case, which it
did, and was ready with a study and a reform proposal to abol-
75. Giuseppe Marino & Andrea Ballancin, The International Effects of Ital-
ian Corporate Tax Reform, 2004 WTD 150-14, Aug. 4, 2004.
76. Matti Halen, Trends in Company/Shareholder Taxation: Single or Double
Taxation, 88a CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONAL 351, 351-52 (2003).
77. Implementing what is known as the dual income tax system typical to
the Scandinavian countries. See Alessandro Bavila, Moving Away from Global
Taxation: Dual Income Tax and Other Forms of Taxation, 41 EUR. TAX'N 211, 211
(2001).
78. Halfn, supra note 76, at 359 (the Finland-Ireland treaty).
79. See, e.g., 1953 Income Tax Convention, U.K.-Greece, art. XIVJune 25,
1953, 190 U.N.T.S. 281.
80. Hal~n, supra note 77, at 359-60. This is a good source for exploring
the practical reasons for the difficulty of extending imputation credits
across-borders because the author was a government official.
81. Case C 319/02, Manninen, [2004] 3 C.M.L.R. 40 (2004).
82. Case C 35/98, Staatssecretaris van Financin v. B.M.G. Verkooijen, 2000
E.C.R. 14071, 1-4130 to 33, which did not involve an integration system, but
rather a Dutch (the prototypical classical system country) dividend exemp-
tion provision and Case C 334/02 Commission v. French Republic, [2005] 2
C.M.L.R. 24 (2005).
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ish the imputation system and replace it with a reduced divi-
dend tax rate system.8 3
Norway, though not an E.U. member, went through a very
similar experience. It originally introduced the imputation
system in 1992, without apparent success beyond the reduc-
tion of the tax burden on investments through corporations.
A recent case challenged the validity of this system, whose ben-
efits were not extended to foreign investors in Norwegian cor-
porations, and was directed (for advice) to the EFTA court,
which predictably ruled the Norwegian withholding tax on div-
idends paid by Norwegian corporations to foreigners (without
imputation credits) discriminatory.84 The Norwegian govern-
ment, similar to the Finnish government, predicted the out-
come and proposed to abolish the imputation system and re-
place it with a reduced dividend tax rate system.8 5 Taken to-
gether, the Manninen and Fokus Bank cases reject all aspects
(outbound and inbound) of a purely domestic imputation sys-
tem in the European (E.U./EEA) context.
Several other countries, European, such as Ireland and
Belgium, and non European, such as Japan and Singapore,
also replaced imputation with various versions of partial (or
full) dividend tax exemption systems.
6. The E. U.
Although not another "country," the E.U. played a central
role in the current trend away from imputation, as apparent
from the above review. There is no European harmonized in-
come tax, a minori ad majus a corporate tax. Nonetheless, as
early as 1966, an expert group recommended the extension of
imputation credits to foreign income,8 6 and in 1975, the Euro-
pean Commission proposed a directive, never adopted and
83. See, e.g., Gunnar Westerlund & Tomi Karsio, Finnish Government In-
troduces Major Tax Reform Package, 2004 WTD 102-2, May 26, 2004.
84. Case E-1/04 Fokus BankJudgment of November 23, 2004, available at
http://www.dinesider.no/customer/770660/archive/files/Decided%20
Cases/2004/eI_- 04decision-e.pdf.
85. Frederick Zimmer, EFTA Court Strikes Down Norwegian Withholding Tax
on Dividends, 2004 WTD 229-3, Nov. 29, 2004, and Frederick Zimmer, Norwe-
gian Government Proposes Tax Reform Legislation, 2004 WTD 201-1, Oct. 18,
2004.
86. Memorandum of the Commission to the Council of 26 June 1967,
BULL. OF THE EUR. ECON. COMMUNITY, Supplement to Bulletin No. 8-1967.
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withdrawn in 1990, to harmonize the corporate tax in Europe
through a partial imputation system.8 7 A 1970 study, however,
recommended to the commission to prefer the classical system
as the basis for E.U. tax harmonization due to its neutrality
and simplicity.88 Although none of the above has ever been
acted upon, the latter approach effectively prevailed through
the jurisprudence of the ECJ, culminating in its Manninen de-
cision, 9 which effectively prohibits the use of an imputation
system if it is not extended in full across-borders. As previously
mentioned, this approach, based on non-discrimination logic,
has been a material factor in the trend away from imputation
explored by this article.
7. Canada, Australia & New Zealand
Finally, some countries did not get discouraged by the dif-
ficulties of implementing imputation across-borders. 90 Ca-
nada, for instance, adopted integration as early as 1949. A
modern partial imputation system, not available for cross-bor-
der investments, was introduced in 1972, and extended as of
1978, with efficiency benefits as its primary objective.91 De-
spite the lack of strong evidence supporting the effectiveness
of this system in Canada, which, in part was due to reasons
unrelated to integration itself, the partial integration system
has been retained. The benefits of integration are generally
not extended across borders, and nevertheless, are not im-
pacted by the nondiscrimination provisions in Canada's tax
treaties. 92
Australia is still one of the keenest devotees of integration.
In 1987 it adopted a full imputation system,93 which employs a
87. Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the harmonization of
systems of company taxation and of withholding taxes on dividends of 5 No-
vember 1975, 1975 OJ. (253) 2. .
88. A. J. Van den Tempel, Corporation Tax and Individual Income Tax
in the European Communities, Commission Studies, Competition - Approx-
imation of Legislation Series no. 15, Brussels, 1970.
89. 'Manninen, supra note 82.
90. There are even new adoptions of imputation systems, such as in Tai-
wan's.
91. Satya N. Poddar, Canada, in IMPUTATION SYSTEMS - OBJECTIVES AND
CONSEQUENCES, 36TH CONGRESS IFA MONTREAL 22 (1983).
92. Mark Brender & PennyJ. Woolford, Canada, 86A STUD. ON INT'L Fis-
CAL L. 235, 238 (2003).
93. Taxation Laws Amendment Act, No. 2 (1987) (Austl).
20051
NYU JOURNAL OF LAW AND BUSINESS
corporate tax at a flat rate equal to the top marginal individual
rate, with any distributions out of taxed corporate earnings
"franked" (i.e. Reflect the tax paid at the corporate level) and
carry a credit for the use of the distribute shareholder against
her basic tax liability.94 The only benefit for foreign share-
holders is the elimination of the withholding tax on franked
dividends. Non-portfolio foreign dividends are largely ex-
empt. Australia does not typically include a nondiscrimination
article in its treaties, so it was not under pressure to equalize
dividend tax treatment across borders on this ground.
Together with Mexico and New Zealand, Canada and Aus-
tralia provide examples of important international players9 5
that did not join the trend and hanged on to imputation. Of
course, it was easier for them to do that because they were not
exposed to the internal E.U. Pressures. Such pressures un-
questionably accelerated this trend; yet, this article argues
there were other reasons to this trend, primarily the insuffi-
cient coordination of international tax policies. The next sec-
tion begins to explore this argument.
D. A Turn of Events with the Turn of the Century
Neither the adoption of imputation, nor its recent rever-
sals were universal. 96 Moreover, despite the dominance of the
leading European countries in both these trends, they were
not alone generating them. At the same time that most of
their trade partners adopted integration, both the U.S. And
the Netherlands resisted reform. In the U.S., several studies
have recommended integration,9 7 mainly for efficiency rea-
94. See Graeme S. Cooper & Sandra M. Lanigan, Australia, 86A STUD. ON
INT'L FiscAL L. 131 (2003), for a more comprehensive description of the
system.
95. Especially from U.S. perspective.
96. As the last paragraph indicates.
97. The most important of which are: the 1977 Treasury proposal on
imputation system (See McLure, supra note 2, at 227-230); the 1981 Prof.
Andrews ALI dividend deduction proposal (See William D. Andrews, The ALI
Reporter's Proposal on Corporate Distributions and Corporate Taxation with a Per-
sonal Consumption Tax, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 333 (1981)); the 1992 Treasury
and the 1993 ALI proposals (See GRAETZ AND WARREN, supra note 2); and the
former proposals reviewed by David Tillinghast (See David Tillinghast, The
USA Reort, in INTERNATIONAL FIsCAL ASSOCIATION, IMPUTATION SYSTEMS -
OBJECTIVES AND CONSEQUENCES, at 51, 52 (IFA Congress Seminar Series No.
7, 1982)).
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sons, but it had never materialized. The main reasons for the
political resistance were the predicted revenue losses and the
resistance of the corporate sector.98 There was also the gen-
eral perception that integration was hard to sell to the public
since it was perceived as a break for the rich and fat, non-tax
paying corporations.99 The Dutch resisted for similar reason,
mainly taking into account the major foreign shareholding in
the large Dutch corporations. They figured out that such a
large group of investors could not be denied a benefit their
own residents enjoyed. Granting imputation credits to all
shareholders was out of the question, both because of sheer
revenue loss reasons and reluctance to transfer the real benefit
to foreign fiscs. This is still the, somewhat unique, Dutch posi-
tion. The U.S., however, in a surprising move, adopted a re-
duced dividend tax rate system, equalizing it to the tax rate for
capital gains and setting it at 15%.100 The reduced rate ap-
plies also to dividends paid by most foreign corporations. 10 1
The declared goals of this reform were economic stimulus and
growth (through the capture of, inter alia, the efficiency bene-
fits of integration). 102
As mentioned in section II.C., other reforms, reaching
similar ends, although opposite in direction, were passed in
the last five years by most of the prominent imputation juris-
dictions: the U.K., Germany, France, etc.10 3 In short, imputa-
tion abruptly lost its appeal as the favorite integration method
and has consistently been replaced by the less accurate re-
duced dividend tax rate system, which, in a way, is a hybrid of
98. See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard, Corporate Tax Integration, the Proper Way to
Eliminate the Corporate Tax, 27 TAx NOTES 637, 639 (May 6, 1985).
99. Fletcher, supra note 17, at 187.
100. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-27, I.R.C. § 302 (2003).
101. Notice 2004-70, 2004-44 I.R.B. 724.
102. But see Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Have I got a Deal for You! Ana-
lyzing the Dividend Exclusion, Tax Analysts, Doc. 2003-2527 (quoting, among
others, Paul Krugman, calling the reform: "The Tax Complication Act of
2003," and arguing that it will provide "stimulus for lawyers"). The desirabil-
ity of the Act or the candor of the administration promoting it are beyond
the scope of this article.
103. See supra Part I.C., and Avi-Yonah, supra note 6, at 1600. (The author
criticizes the Bush administration's tax reform; an appendix, authored by
Yoram Keinan provides an excellent review of some of the relevant develop-
ments).
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dividend exclusion and the classical system. This raises the
question whether a progression towards convergence of these
tax systems is on the horizon. 10 4 Although answering this
question in full is beyond the scope of this article, some devel-
opments in this direction laid the ground for this article's ar-
gument that revival of imputation through enhanced interna-
tional cooperation is feasible.
Note also that in many cases the benefits of integrations
could not be captured due to negating policies (Germany,
France, Italy, etc.), such as deferral and strict foreign currency
controls. Although not explicitly articulated, it is not hard to
understand that imputation suffered due to its sensitivity to
the effects of such extraneous policies. One may argue that
this supports the argument that imputation is inferior to other
methods and should therefore be replaced. This, of course, is
not an inevitable conclusion - if integration benefits exceed
the benefits of these other policies it may be reasonable to pre-
fer its retention rather than an awkward "survival of the fittest"
mode of norms coordination. There is no indication that such
a benefits-evaluation study had been made in any of these
countries prior to their repeal of imputation. Moreover, some
of these contradicting policies, such as foreign currency con-
trols, have been phased out in recent years for other reasons
anyway.
III.
THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF INTEGRATION AS A PRIMARY
EXPLANATION OF CuRRENT TAX POLICY TRENDS
It is sometimes hard to comprehend that international
constraints force us to change our long-standing policies, espe-
cially when we do not have reason to believe that these policies
are wrong "for us." This is particularly true in the tax dis-
course, since tax has always been perceived as a major factor in
the sovereignty of nation states as we know them. However,
the power of these international constraints in the interna-
tional tax area, most notably in the more open economies, is
significant, and may become decisive with economic globaliza-
tion. The constant decline (and convergence) in worldwide
corporate tax rates in the last twenty years is a classic example
for that - governments with different needs and priorities feel
104. See Vann, supra note 6, at 69.
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bound by the current range of acceptable rates. 105
A. Introduction: The International Dimension of Imputation
This article argues, as aforesaid, that a very similar process
played a major role in the reversal of the almost universal
trend of adopting integration in general and imputation in
particular in the 21st century. The following tables depict the
difficulty of plainly extending the benefits of imputation
across borders. Table III (A) uses the same basic example used
in Part II to demonstrate the consequences of unilaterally ex-
tending imputation credits to foreign taxes borne by domestic
investors, and some policy options that may assist in alleviating
these consequences.
TABLE III(A)
Investor country Imputation
Credit granted Plus no Plus gross-tip
Domestic to foreign withholding for foreign
investment investments tax at source corporate taxSource countr
10 6
Corporate income 100 100 100 100
35% corporate tax 35 35 35 35
After-tax corporate income 65 65 65 65
Withholding tax if distributed
(15%) - 9.75 0 0
Residence country
Dividend (grossed up) 100 65 65 100
40% Individual tax 40 26 26 40
Imputation credit 35 35/65=22.75 35/65=22.75 35
Foreign tax credit - 9.75 0 0
Residual residence country
tax 5 0 3.25 5
Excess credit - 6.5 - -
Result
Total tax 40 44.75 38.25 40
Shareholder income after tax 60 55.25 61.75 60
Revenue split
Source country share - 44.75 35 35
0 (plus 6.5
Residence country share 40 excess credit) 3.25 5
105. See, e.g., KPMG, Press Release, KPMG Corporate Tax Rate Survey for 2004
- Rates Still Falling (May 3, 2004), available at http://www.kpmg.ca/en/
news/documents/CorpTaxRateSurvey2004.pdf (hereinafter "KPMG re-
port").
106. 106. For these purposes it does not matter whether the source
country has a classical, imputation or reduced rate system - all result in
similar consequences.
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The comparison of the first and second column demon-
strates the most direct and acute consequence - simply ex-
tending (unilaterally) imputation credits for foreign taxes re-
sults in no revenue to the imputation residence country. It
may even result in a transfer to the fisc of another country if
excess credit, similar to the one in the example, is allowed to
be used. Moreover, even now CEN is not typically met because
the source country's share is larger than the total level of do-
mestic taxation in an imputation country (44.75 v. 40 in the
above example). The results are less harsh if the source coun-
try agreed to elimination of the withholding tax on dividends.
In that case, the source country keeps just its corporate level
tax, and the imputation residence country collects the differ-
ence between the source country's corporate tax rate and its
individual rate. For that to work, the residence imputation
country needs to gross-up the dividend amount to reflect the
foreign corporate tax paid as demonstrated by the third and
fourth columns above. If that were the case, the imputation
residence country could maintain CEN and potentially collect
some tax in these circumstances. Note, however, that for this
to be realistic source countries must give up their withholding
tax on dividends 0 7 and cooperate with the residence imputa-
tion system at a level that would make the above gross-up
mechanism feasible. Effective sharing of information - more
effective than anything we have at the present - is crucial for
this mechanism to succeed.
Table III(B) complements Table III(A) with the conse-
quences of extending imputation benefits to foreign investors
in domestic (imputation country) corporations. One possible
way of achieving that is for the imputation country to unilater-
ally eliminate its own withholding tax on dividend income.
The consequences of that are demonstrated in the first two
columns:
107. As elaborated on below, this is not a far-fetched possibility. See infra
Part W.A.
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TABLE III1(B)
Investor country Classical
WHT WHT
elimination elimination
Imputation
Plus Credit
granted to
foreign
investments
Plus gross-up
for foreign
corporate
tax
Source country (Imputation)
Corporate income
35% corporate tax
After-tax corporate income
Withholding tax if distributed
(15%)
Residence country
Dividend (grossed up)
40% Individual tax
Imputation credit
Foreign tax credit
Residual residence country
tax
Excess credit
Result
Total tax
Shareholder income after tax
Revenue split
Source country share
Residence country share
65 65 65
26 26 26
35/
- - 65=22.75
- - 0
26 26 3.25
61 61 38.25
39 39 61.75
35 35 35
26 26 3.25
Under current rules, this policy option works well with
classical (or reduced rate) 108 country investors,' 0 9 but not with
imputation country investors. If, however, the residence impu-
tation country implemented the relief rules described in Table
III(A), potentially acceptable results could be achieved.110
Neutrality would basically be achieved (ignoring rate differ-
ences) "'1 for both residence and source countries. Again, this
is not the result under current rules, which creates a (tax) bias
108. Reduced rate country investors face similar consequences to classical
country investors, only their residence tax level is lower, and consequently
the residence country share is lower.
109. CEN is basically maintained in the classical country, and its share of
tax acceptably reflect its individual (dividend) tax rate.
110. Of course, for that to be possible, both elimination of withholding
taxes on dividend income and an effective sharing of information are re-
quired. See Ault, supra note 15, at 581-82.
111. Thomas Horst, A Note on the Optimal Taxation of International Invest-
ment Income, 94 Q. J. ECON. 793, 796 (1980).
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against cross-border corporate investment involving imputa-
tion countries.
As already explored, the purpose of integration is to en-
hance the neutrality of the tax system, by removing tax wedges
from decisions to invest or do business through corporations
or otherwise. In the international setting, however, integra-
tion, and especially its most popular form, the imputation sys-
tem, actually frustrated the neutrality of tax systems from an
allocative efficiency perspective by favoring domestic invest-
ment over foreign investment, as demonstrated in the above
simple example. This difficulty has been known for some
years now.11 2
B. Nondiscrimination and Imputation
An extremely interesting footnote written by Professor
Richard Bird twenty years ago states: "there is no case for con-
cluding that the international tail (nondiscrimination) should
necessarily wag the domestic dog (integration)."1 1 3 As should
be apparent by now, while this article supports this conclusion
in principle, reality proved it wrong, at least for now - nondis-
crimination international obligations of countries crippled im-
putation, almost eradicating it in Europe. Professor Bird
made the above conclusion in a discussion of international eq-
uity implications of integration. Without ruling one way or an-
other regarding the significance of international equity con-
siderations or whether imputation should be affected by such
considerations, this article takes nondiscrimination obligations
of countries to be what they are - international obligations of
all the countries involved. It is quite straightforward that by
extending the benefits of integration to domestic investment
by domestic investors only, these countries violate their inter-
national obligations. These obligations meant much more in
the E.U., where they were important structural fundamentals
112. See, e.g., Richard M. Bird, International Aspects of Integration, 28 NAT'L
TAxJ. 302, 306-09 (1975); Robin Boadway & Neil Bruce, Problems with Inte-
grating Corporate and Personal Income Taxes in an Open Economy, 48 J. PUB.
ECON 39, 56-62 (1992); Richard J. Vann, International Implications of Imputa-
tion, 2 AUSTL. TAX F. 451, 496 (1985) (acknowledging these difficulties in the
context of Australia's contemplation of adopting its imputation system).
113. Bird, supra note 113, at 310 n.26.
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in the creation of the single market, and indeed, as is well-
known by now, the European assault succeeded.
In most countries, the technical nature of the nondiscrim-
ination obligations contributed to the repeal of imputation
and the adoption of the reduced rate system. The reduced
rates system has been successful in maintaining neutrality, yet
at the expense of overall higher tax rates on both domestic
and international investment. Two immediate results of these
higher tax rates could be the loss of some efficiency gains and
an increased incentive to take advantage of deferral opportu-
nities. 114 All the distortions attributed to the classical system
persist under this system, even if in a lesser form.
These results cannot be desirable. Nevertheless, the con-
ventional wisdom is that the above effect of nondiscrimination
was the primary reason for the repeal of imputation in so
many countries. This conventional wisdom cannot, however,
explain the abruptness and the extent of the policy moves
away from imputation. Nominally, only the Finnish (2003)
and Norwegian (2004) systems were officially condemned,
whereas the major European economies began their reforms
earlier. Moreover, while it is true that the ECJ has only re-
cently started to expand its activism to tax matters, non-dis-
crimination provisions have not changed for many years, and
technically could have been used for many years to assert some
pressure on imputation countries to either extend them
across-borders or to abandon them; this did not happen due
to the lack of sufficient interest for other countries to compel
imputation countries to change their policies - capital import-
ing countries collected their share of tax anyway and capital
export countries attempted to solve some of the situations at
the bilateral level with important counterpart. These attempts
were not very successful in general; in some cases, countries,
such as France, developed certain mechanisms to extend the
benefits of their imputation systems to foreigners in an at-
tempt to attract investments. These attempts, however, were
the exception rather than the rule.
114. This is due to the increased disparity between the corporate tax rate
alone and the effective tax rate (corporate + individual (residual) dividend
tax rate).
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C. Imputation in a Non-Cooperative World
Another explanation for the development described thus
far is that, until the late 1990s, international investment was
not voluminous enough for countries to concede what they
considered a desirable policy (imputation). Since countries
acknowledged that the unilateral extension of the benefits of
integration to foreign investment and foreign investors would
amount to a transfer to a foreign fisc, 11 5 they simply kept im-
putation as a purely domestic policy. This is a classic example
of the revenue flight tension so typical in our globalizing world
- a desirable policy was exposed to risk of cannibalization (of
revenues) by trade partners, and countries therefore preferred
a safer, but less desirable tax policy.116
Except for some attempts, in certain narrow circum-
stances, no cooperative efforts were made to accommodate im-
putation at the international level.1 17 The rules of the interna-
tional tax regime were, and still are, based on the classical sys-
tem, and the regime itself was premised on reciprocity rather
than coordination of polices - a version of cooperation
through retaliation, so typical to non-cooperative settings." 8
There were basically two alternatives to the exclusive applica-
tion of imputation: reduction or elimination of dividend with-
holding taxes by imputation countries in the inbound context
or the implementation of a clearing mechanism that would
govern some agreed-upon revenue sharing in the outbound
context."19 The former was generally unfair (and therefore
unacceptable) to the imputation country since it gave up reve-
nue that it deserved under the basic principles without any re-
ciprocal concession by its treaty partner. The latter was con-
sidered impossible in the uncooperative environment. 20
Imputation countries began to realize that even in the ex-
clusively domestic application of imputation world they could
not win. Their investors faced in other countries, even prior
to the application of the domestic tax system, taxes higher
115. See, e.g., supra Table III(A) ("Credit granted to foreign investments").
116. See Brauner, supra note 18 (discussing the revenue flight tension).
117. See Ault, supra note 15, at 581.
118. See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 118-23
(1984).
119. Ault, supra note 15 at 579.
120. Id.
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than the overall effective tax on domestic investment, and
they collected from foreigners taxes higher than those on do-
mestic investors, thus deterring such (especially portfolio) for-
eign investment. This imbalance was unbearable to both capi-
tal exporters and capital importers.
IV.
CONCLUSION: THE BENEFITS OF INTEGRATION COULD BE
CAPTURED THROUGH ENHANCED INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
A. Reviving Imputation Through Enhanced
Coordination is Feasible
To this point, the discussion portrayed the future of inte-
gration in quite gloomy colors. This does not have to be the
case. As demonstrated above, and explored for some years
now in the tax literature, the international dimension crippled
imputation, and the resurgence of non-discrimination (partic-
ularly of the European expansive version) completed the as-
sault, making it an exceptional oddity in just five years. The
inability of countries to extend the benefits of imputation
across borders was the Achilles heel of the system. The demise
of imputation did not imply the demise of integration, how-
ever, as practically all of the countries who repealed imputa-
tion replaced it with another tax regime that is designed to
eliminate (alas not completely) double taxation of corporate
profits. 121 The logical conclusion from these developments is,
as acknowledged earlier, 122 that imputation could be saved if it
could be extended across-borders. The purpose of this article
was to explore this possibility. It concludes, next, that some
international tax developments, together with a general (inde-
pendent of integration) necessity to enhance international tax
policy coordination may present an opportunity for that to
happen.123
One such development, which is not particularly new, is
the convergence of corporate tax rates in most major and
121. Id. (replacing it with either a reduced dividend tax rate system or
dividend expansion).
122. But see Avi-Yonah, supra note 6, at 1600 (concluding that imputation
could not be saved).
123. See Yariv Brauner, An International Tax Regime in Crystallization, 56 TAX
L. REV. 259, 291-93 (2003).
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other important economies. 124 This convergence of the con-
stantly declining rates presents an opportunity for integra-
tion 125 because taxing international income in a rational way is
much easier when international corporate tax rates are at
roughly the same level. 126 In our case, it ensures a certain min-
imum level of taxation for the source country (35% in our ex-
ample, which should be generally realistic, if not a bit high);
minimal level does not imply a low tax share, since this "bite"
should generally be very significant in comparison to the maxi-
mal level of taxation which an imputation country wishes to
impose on investment in corporations overall (40% in our ex-
ample). Further, it means that the country in which the busi-
ness is conducted primarily taxes its profits, and the investor
(residence) country is left only with a small margin of poten-
tial taxation if it wishes to adhere to integration. Finally, any
reference to the tax collected at the corporate level by the
source country should be easier once rates and maybe even
base rules converge.
A more recent development is the willingness of some
countries, primarily the U.S., to eliminate (reduce to zero)
their withholding tax on dividend income paid to foreigners.
Such elimination is gradual, applied only to direct investors
(not portfolio) through a handful of reciprocal bilateral tax
treaties. However, these treaties now "cover" a significant por-
tion of international investment. 27 The effect of elimination
of dividend withholding taxes can be seen in Tables 111(a) and
111(b). Reciprocal elimination of withholding taxes alone does
not reduce the total tax - it just changes the revenue share,
leaving more revenue to the residence country. This mere rev-
enue flight cannot be acceptable, standing alone, and is not
desirable as it does not integrate the systems; however, it
presents an opportunity for imputation countries to extend
imputation benefits across-borders. This ensures that the over-
all tax does not exceed its top individual rate and still even
collect a minimal tax. A classical country gives away withhold-
124. See KPMG report, supra note 105, at 1.
125. This article assumes that integration, if adopted, will be at the share-
holder rather than the corporate level.
126. Ault, supra note 15, at 566; see also supra note 103 and accompanying
text.
127. See Ault, supra note 15, at 567, 568 (referencing in the U.S. context,
the treaties with the U.K., Australia, the Netherlands, and Mexico).
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ing tax on inbound investments, yet it benefits from the recip-
rocal elimination of withholding taxes in the imputation coun-
try, resulting in a larger share of revenue on outbound invest-
ment. A cost/benefit analysis of each bilateral situation
should result in different balances, yet adjustments could be
made in each case without much complication if the countries
cooperate at a high enough level. A major difficulty for this
article is that some countries, including the U.S., do not cur-
rently eliminate the withholding tax on dividends to portfolio
investors. Several commentators in various occasions exposed
the futility of this policy.128 Although not clear, it is not incon-
ceivable that countries will eventually abolish this withholding
tax or reduce it from its OECD recommended level of 15%
through enhanced international cooperation.
To complete the picture, economic globalization chal-
lenges the currently stable international tax regime to adapt to
the proliferation of international business and investment as
economies open. Enhanced cooperation and coordination of
tax policies is the key for successful evolvement of this regime
and the maintenance of its stability. 129 Specifically for the pur-
poses of this article, the current international tax regime is
premised on the basis of the classical system, as demonstrated
above. 13 0 Changing that does not require deconstruction of a
type that should threaten the stability of the regime, because it
is still based on the basic principles of this regime: the source
country primarily taxes business income and the residence
country gets the residual taxing right, reciprocity is generally
kept as the fundamental rule, although in some cases coun-
tries could agree to divert from strict reciprocity if the commu-
nication line between the treaty parties would be kept open.
Preferably, it would be made better, requiring a more effective
exchange of information, for instance.
There are some additional challenges to this model pro-
posal. One obvious challenge is the interference of tax
havens. Their impact, however, is not different than under
the current regime, although in a world without dividend with-
holding taxes countries may need to be more careful in curb-
128. See, e.g., Kees van Raad, Commentary Approaches to Internationally Inte-
grated Taxation of Distributed Corporate Income, 47 TAX L. REv. 613, 619 (1992).
129. Brauner, supra note 124, at 325.
130. See, e.g., Ault, supra note 15, at 569-70.
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ing tax haven based tax evasion. A more concerning challenge
may be that some typical capital importing countries hang on
to source taxation as a primary source of revenue. The analy-
sis of the desirability of this approach is beyond the scope of
this article. Nonetheless, such insistence should not present a
prohibitive challenge to the proposed solution model since in
most of these countries it should not be necessary for jump-
starting such an attempt, and, anyway, their needs could be
met in a separate arrangement. They will, however, face in-
creased pressure to open their economies due to competition
over capital from countries that will subscribe to the new re-
gime (and reduce or eliminate their dividend withholding
taxes).
Despite all of the above, countries did not choose to take
this path, but rather chose to replace imputation with an inte-
gration system that is not perfect, yet easier to implement in
this world. This concern raises the question of incentives, or
how (and if) this proposal could materialize.
B. Reviving Imputation through Enhanced Coordination
is Probably Desirable
Advocating a solution model that opposes the direction of
the actual behavior of countries requires one to carry a heavy
burden in an attempt to prove its desirability. Moreover, in
our case, leading experts consider the practical benefits of in-
tegration in general and imputation in particular rather mi-
nor.13' Doubters argue that in most cases the biases created by
the classical system are mitigated by other provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code that provide self-help options to corpo-
rations, and that corporations who choose not to take advan-
tage of these opportunities do not require legal protection.
The debt/equity bias goes the argument is not even solved by
integration - only mitigated at best. Finally, economic analysis
did not reach consensus regarding some key aspects of taxa-
tion of corporate profits - most importantly the real incidence
of the corporate tax and whether the tax on dividends affects
stock prices, 132 and therefore some of the theoretical benefits
of integration remain doubtful.
131. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 6.
132. This is the famous old v. new view of dividend taxation. See, e.g., Alan
Auerbach, Taxation and Corporate Financial Policy, in 3 HANDBOOK OF PUB.
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The two first hurdles are, of course, related, since the
doubts about the benefits of integration in the international
setting led to the policy reversals. Note, however, that even if
this was the rational choice in the current international envi-
ronment, it does not mean that the efficiency benefits of inte-
gration should be ignored. The fact that they are mitigated in
many cases, such as those described above, does not mean that
they are not significant enough to justify a reform such as the
one suggested in this article.
Regarding the debt/equity bias, the argument is that this
bias is not unique to the corporate tax regime, but rather a
problem of the income tax as such.'3 3 This is true, yet integra-
tion mitigates the bias, and therefore seems superior to a class-
ical system from this perspective. Others proposed to keep the
classical system as "a global means of tax harmonization," with
the slight adjustment of double-taxing interest income (disal-
lowing the interest expense deduction) to equate its treatment
with dividend income.1 34 This proposal does seem to present
a politically more likely reform than the one proposed in this
article, apart from its theoretical undesirability; moreover, it
requires international cooperation of a similar degree - a re-
quirement that casts further doubt about its superiority.
The two unresolved theoretical economic debates do cast
doubt on the benefits of integration. This should not, how-
ever, discourage an otherwise desirable attempt to enhance in-
ternational cooperation on tax matters. Further, once an in-
ternational tax organization is formed, for instance, this doubt
should not discourage the major economies from considering
the suggestions of this article, since it is hard to imagine that
any outcome of these debates will result in the classical system
being more efficient, and since there are no normative justifi-
ECON. (Alan Auerbach and Martin Feldstein, eds., 2003). These views are
traditionally associated with: Martin Feldstein, Corporate Taxation and Divi-
dend Behavior, 37 REv. ECON. STUDIEs 57 (1970) (discussing the old view);
Alan Auerbach, Wealth Maximization and the Cost of Capital, 93 Q.J. ECON. 433
(1979); and David F. Bradford, The Incidence and Allocation Effects of a Tax on
Corporate Distributions, 15 J. PUB. ECON. 1 (1981) (discussing the new view).
133. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 6, at 1601 n.17 (referring to Alvin C. War-
ren Jr., Financial Contract Innovation and Income Tax Policy, 107 HARV. L. REv.
460 (1993)).
134. Kari & Yld-Liedenpohja, supra note 40.
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cations for the classical system except for alleged lower admin-
istrative costs.
C. The Importance of Reviving Imputation
through Enhanced Coordination
Dividend yields have been declining in the last decades
and are currently low worldwide.13 5 Moreover, the vast eco-
nomic literature analyzing dividend policy in general and the
effect of dividend taxation on corporate decisions continues to
evolve with no clear consensus. Recent studies indicate, how-
ever, that even if taxes have some effect on the decision to
distribute dividends it is only minor, 136 and may be significant
only in the case of a small number of corporations.1 37 This
reality does cast doubt on the practical desirability of diverting
efforts and resources to the reform suggested in this article.
In conclusion, the suggested reform is both feasible and
desirable if countries choose to adopt it in concert. Its biggest
hurdle is that there is probably no imputation country that is
economically strong enough to begin the process of interna-
tional extension of imputation through enhanced coopera-
tion, even if all remaining imputation countries combined
forces. Absent an international organization's effort it does
not seem to be realistic. The OECD or any of its larger econo-
mies do not have sufficient interest injumpstarting the process
and an international tax organization is, alas, still in the works.
In addition, the magnitude of the gains from such an effort is
doubtful, and therefore, it is hard to say if such an effort is
worthwhile for now.
135. See, e.g., RAj CHETTY & EMMANUEL SAEz, DIVIDEND TAXES AND CORPO-
RATI BEHAVIOUR: EVIDENCE FROM THE 2003 DIVIDEND TAX CUT (Centre for
Econ. Pol'y Res., Discussion Paper No. 4722, 2004), available at http://www.
cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?dpno=4722 (noting the exception of a
slight increase in the post-JGTRRA U.S.).
136. See, e.g., ALON BRAY ET AL., PAYOUT POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=358582.
137. Even then, the effect was accounted for only when a significant and
abrupt tax rate reduction was enacted. See, e.g., CHETrY & SAz, supra note
135.
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